ABSTRACT A rating system provides rating data about products or services, which is a key feature of e-commerce websites such as Amazon, TripAdvisor, and so on. In reality, rating systems generally suffer from threats of profile injection attacks or anomalous ratings due to the integration of collaborative recommendation techniques. To reduce these risks, a number of detection methods have been developed for defending such potential threats. However, they either directly calculate similarity between users or items to recognize attack profiles and genuine profiles, or utilize supervised learning methods by extracting features from user profiles for anomaly detection. In this paper, we propose a stepwise detection method to spot anomalous ratings or attacks, which bypasses the hard problems of similarity calculation and feature extraction. First, a part of samples are randomly selected from original user profiles for constructing a submatrix (rating matrix). A fast max-margin matrix factorization is then employed to make rating prediction. After that, suspected items can be captured by comprehensively analyzing both the distributions of mean prediction errors of items and users. Finally, anomalous ratings and potential attackers can be directly returned. Extensive experiments on MovieLens-100K data set demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach compared with benchmarked methods. It is noteworthy that suspected items on a large-scale real-world data set, Amazon data, are detected by the proposed method and further analyzed from diverse perspectives, including rating distribution, rating intention, and time series analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is quite natural that rating data is ubiquitous on Amazon, TripAdvisor, and etc. Specifically, collaborative filtering recommendation techniques play a crucial role in these systems. In reality, rating systems generally suffer from threats of attacks or anomalous ratings [1] - [7] . Collaborative filtering recommender systems (CFRSs) have been broadly used to make quality recommendations and increase sales in such systems. However, since good ratings promise a good selling rate, these systems are prone to manipulation from producers or malicious users. Examples of manipulation have been outlined in [8] and include attacks from popular systems like Amazon, eBay, and etc. More specifically, CFRSs are highly vulnerable to profile injection attacks or shilling attacks due to its open nature [7] - [18] . According to the attack intentions, shilling attacks can be classified into two basic categories: inserting malicious profiles which rate a particular item highly is termed push attack, while inserting malicious profiles aimed at downgrading the popularity of an item is called nuke attack [19] . Nevertheless, shilling profiles look very similar to genuine profiles, it is difficult to correctly identify such profiles. These attacks can affect the quality of the prediction for many users, resulting in decreasing the recommendation accuracy and overall user satisfaction with the system [1] , [20] - [24] . Thus, it is really urgent to strengthen the robustness of such systems and effectively defend the attacks.
Existing work in this area has focused on detecting and preventing profile injection attacks. They either developed supervised approaches to discriminate between attack profiles and genuine profiles, which extracts diverse features from original profiles as far as possible [2] , [12] , [18] , [25] - [30] , or investigated unsupervised methods to directly capture concerned attack profiles [4] , [30] - [33] . For the supervised detection approaches, they are really effective to distinguish between attack profiles and genuine profiles in some extent, but these supervised methods (e.g., classification based) significantly depend on extracted features. In reality, it is difficult to extract more effective features from user profiles compared with previously extracted features. Furthermore, it is impractical to extract features from largescale datasets such as Amazon dataset, Yelp dataset, and etc. For the unsupervised detection methods, on the one hand, feature extraction is also considered by those unsupervised methods (e.g., k-means) to spot anomalous users. On the other hand, since attackers try to make their profiles look similar to genuine ones, it is difficult to correctly identify shilling attackers. Calculating similarity between users or items (e.g., using pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) [2] , [32] , [34] ) is naturally used to discriminate between attack profiles and genuine profiles. However, computational cost of similarity calculation should be considered as a nonignorable issue, especially for handling large-scale datasets.
Despite the extensiveness of previous studies, researchers have primarily concentrated on discovering the unusual ratings distribution of attacks by examining an individual attack profile. In contrast, few researches have focused on analyzing the difference between attackers and genuine users as a group [35] . The main goal of previous research has tended to be the improvement of detection accuracy on attack profiles while ignoring the misclassification of genuine users. As a result, most previous methods suffer from high false-positive rates that may influence the recommendation quality negatively. Note that, a more practical detection approach should perform well detection performance on experimentally generated datasets while keeping an effective detection on realworld dataset (e.g., Amazon) should also be considered.
In this paper, we propose an unsupervised detection approach to spot abnormal ratings, which combines a fast max-margin matrix factorization with Bayesian nonparametrics and outlier detection. To bypass the hard problems of feature extraction and similarity calculation, we construct a stepwise detection approach for spotting anomalous ratings. Considering large-scale datasets (i.e., Amazon dataset), a random sampling method is used to generate profile samples, which keeps an acceptable sample size. Based on the sampled rating profiles (rating matrix), a fast and accurate matrix factorization algorithm is employed to predict ratings. For discriminating between suspected and unsuspected items from the results of rating prediction, mean prediction error (MPE) for each item is calculated to find out all suspected items. Furthermore, MPE for each user is also calculated to spot anomalous users. What is even more important, the MPE for each user is only considered on those suspected items while remaining all ratings with minimum score (for nuke attacks) or maximum score (for push attacks).
By comprehensively analyzing the distributions of MPEs of users and items, detected users and items can be finally returned. Extensive experiments on MovieLens-100k dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed detection method compared with competing methods. It is noteworthy that experiments on a real-world unlabeled dataset, Amazon, are conducted and analyzed to find interesting discoveries from the perspectives of rating distribution, rating intention and time series analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of related researches. Section 3 introduces the basic background knowledge on shilling attacks. Section 4 proposes our detection approach with detailed analysis. The experimental results are shown and discussed in section 5. Section 6 highlights the conclusions and future work of the research.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Since shilling profiles are very similar to genuine profiles, it is difficult to correctly identify such attack profiles by purely depending on similarity. Defending anomalous ratings in ratings systems has been received much attention. Previously related researches can be approximately summarized in the following three aspects.
A. CLASSIFICATION BASED
A number of features are defined to distinguish shilling attackers from genuine users in the literature. Originally, Chirita et al. [25] developed several statistical features to characterize attack profiles for the detection of high-density attack profiles. Then, Williams et al. [2] , [28] , [29] presented different features extracted from user profiles for their utility in attack detection including two kinds of features, namely generic features and model-specific features. Based on the existing features, He et al. [12] employed rough set theory to detect attackers. They directly used feature values as the condition attributes of the decision table to perform the operations of reducing data and generating rules. After that, Zhang and Zhou [18] developed an ensemble approach to improve the precision of detection by exploiting metalearning technique and 13 diverse features. Afterwards, Morid and Shajari [27] proposed a supervised method (classification method, KNN) to detect attackers using 12 diverse features. In addition, they just focused on all influential users to further improve detection performance. To explore novel features for supervised method, Zhang and Zhou [30] proposed a novel online detection approach by combining Hilbert-Huang transform (HHT) and support vector machine (SVM) to improve detection performance. What is more, they creatively extracted 17 features from user profiles, which is different from traditional features.
B. SIMILARITY BASED
Su et al. [31] presented a spreading similarity algorithm in order to capture groups of similar attackers, which uses pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) [2] , [34] . In addition VOLUME 6, 2018 to this, Mehta et al. [4] , [19] , [36] proposed a PCA-based (Principal Component Analysis based) detection method to spot attack profiles. They utilized the similarity structure in attack profiles to separate them from genuine profiles by exploiting unsupervised dimensionality reduction. Since the similarities between attackers are higher than genuine users, features based on calculating similarity such as Degree of Similarity with Top Neighbors (DegSim) etc., are presented for capturing attackers from genuine profiles [2] , [28] , [29] , it is effective to distinguish between attackers and genuine users in some extent.
C. REAL-WORLD DATASET APPLICATIONS
To detect anomalous ratings on real-world datasets such as Amazon, Yelp, and etc, several researches have been developed for these practical applications. Günnemann et al. [37] proposed a detection technique to spot base behavior of users regarding a product's evaluation over time and suspected points in time. Furthermore, Günnemann et al. [38] investigated a practical detection method using Baysian model to represent the rating data as sequence of categorical mixture models. In addition, the anomalous ratings can be defended via its prediction function. Some interesting discoveries from the real-world datasets have been found out in the experiments.
To sum up, the detection methods based on existing features and similarity calculation could not perfectly distinguish between attack profiles and genuine profiles. It is difficult to extract more effective features from user profiles. Additionally, directly calculating similarity between users is very time consuming, especially for those largescale datasets. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to construct an effective detection method that can successfully bypass or overcome those challenges as well as handle largescale datasets.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we firstly describe notations used in the paper. Then, we briefly introduce the basic structure of profile injection attacks.
A. NOTATIONS
In order to facilitate descriptions and discussions, Table 1 summarizes all descriptions of notations used throughout this paper.
B. THE STRUCTURE OF ATTACK PROFILES
Attackers have different attack intentions to bias the recommendation results to achieve their benefits in CFRSs, which demote (called nuke attack) or promote (called push attack) the target items with the lowest or highest rating. In order to nuke or push a target item, the attackers inject well-designed attack profiles to genuine profiles [2] , [27] , [28] , [36] , [39] , [40] . The general form of an attack profile is shown in Table 2 . In Table 2 , the set of target items I T consists of single target item (called single-target attack) or multiple target items (called multiple-target attack). The target item i t will be given a rating as determined by the function γ , generally this will be either the maximum rating (termed push attack) or minimum rating (termed nuke attack). For the set of selected items I S , some attacks require identifying a group of items for special treatment during the attack. The special set I S receives rating as specified by the function σ . The set of filler items I F is added as specified by the function ρ. Finally, I N are those items with no ratings in the profiles [2] .
To conduct experimental datasets, we introduce 11 general attack models to generate attack profiles which consist of two kinds of attacks, general attack models and recently published attacks. The details of each attack model will be introduced in section V-A2.
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we firstly introduce the overview of the proposed approach and then discuss the details of each stage. Note that, a fast max-margin matrix factorization is employed to construct a rating prediction matrix. Finally, outlier detection is discussed based on prediction results. Moreover, discovering interesting findings on real-world data using the presented detection framework is also investigated.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The framework of the proposed approach is provided as shown in Figure 1 , it consists of four major stages: 1) Training model: generating a sub-matrix from the original rating matrix and training a rating prediction model M . 2) Rating prediction: predicting on test datasets using the trained model and calculating prediction deviation for each user and item. 3) Outlier detection: comprehensively analyzing both mean prediction errors of user and item, only focuses on the minimum rating (e.g., nuke attacks) in order to determine suspicious items and users. 
4)
Abnormality forensics: all detected suspicious items on real-world data are further analyzed and determined using presented forensics metrics. Originally, genuine profiles and attack profiles (generated by experiments) are combined in order to construct final synthetic datasets. For each attack, the injection attack profiles are conducted with diverse attack sizes and filler sizes (corresponding details will be introduced in section V-A1). In other words, the constructed datasets already contain a part of noise data (attack profiles), which make a challenge for rating prediction later.
Based on the constructed data, a sub-matrix is obtained from the rating matrix using a random partition method. The rating prediction model M is firstly trained by exploiting a novel matrix factorization approach. After that, prediction deviations for each user and item are calculated. Note that, we only focus on the minimum rating r min (for nuke attack) in the testing matrix in order to calculate mean prediction error of users and items. Due to the fact that shilling attackers demote (take nuke attack for example) the target items with the minimum rating. Calculating prediction deviation based on the minimum rating is favorable to capture anomalous rating behaviors and partly avoid the influence of normal ratings on anomaly detection.
Specially, anomalous ratings are finally determined by comprehensively analyzing both the mean prediction errors of users and items. In addition, to discover interesting findings on real-world data using the presented detection framework, we investigate suspicious items determined the presented method and naturally propose three abnormality forensics metrics to further analyze suspected items or ratings. More details will be discussed in section V-D.
B. RATING PREDICTION
The stage of rating prediction of the proposed detection approach is to obtain prediction deviations of users and items.
It is noteworthy that the prediction stage dose not directly determine the whole detection performance of the presented detection model. How to selectively calculate the concerned prediction deviation for each user and item is our original intention. Relatively obvious rating deviations are considered as abnormalities and further concerned in the next stage. In this paper, we employ a novel probabilistic interpretation of max-margin matrix factorization approach to make a prediction for each user and item.
The task of prediction is usually formalized as a matrix completion problem, which fills missing entries (i.e., movies, books) into a partially observed user-item rating matrix. Given a rating matrix M m×n with m users and n items, M m×n can be written as a low-rank factorized form U m×k V n×k that simultaneously approximates the observed entries of M m×n under some loss measures (i.e., squared error etc.) [41] , where U m×k denotes a m × k user-specific coefficient matrix, V n×k denotes a n × k item-specific factor matrix and k is the number of latent factors. Max-margin matrix factorization extends the model using a sparsity-inducing norm regularizer for a low-norm factorization and adopting hinge loss for the error measure like hinge loss error (HLE) [42] . To find an approximate low-rank matrix X ∈ R m×n for the original rating matrix Y ∈ R m×n , an optimization problem of matrix factorization is described as follows:
where X * denotes the nuclear norm of X and h(x) = max(0, 1 − x) denotes the hinge loss.
Only on U and V instead, where U denotes the user coefficient matrix and V denotes the item factor matrix, the optimization problem of variational form can be rewritten as follows by using gradient descent,
where
By formalizing the deterministic regularized risk minimization (RRM) problem (Eq. IV.2) as an equivalent maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation problem, the optimization equation (Eq. IV.1) can be rewritten as follows,
is the discriminant function for giving a prediction score s, L(y, s) is the loss function, and
is a set of training data. In addition, M denotes the model and (M) is the regularizer which is critical to save the model from over-fitting. Also, C is a regularization constant. N n=1 R(M; X n ) denotes the empirical loss. Inspired from the studies of Xu et al. [41] - [43] , we exploit the advantages of matrix factorization to predict ratings for target users on target items. Thereupon, a fast max-margin matrix factorization method is employed, which combines maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation and Bayesian nonparametrics to construct a novel interpretation of max-margin matrix factorization (called Gibbs iPM 3 F) [41] . Based on the optimistic prediction accuracy, analyzing error distributions of items and users using mean prediction error is comprehensively discussed.
Given a set of training data X = {X n } N n=1 , a probabilistic extension to the original deterministic risk minimization problem ( , R) is described as follows:
is the regularizer which is critical to save the model from over-fitting. C denotes a balancing factor. In addition, P denotes a space of valid probability distributions, q(M ) denotes a posterior distribution derived from out generic inference procedure.
Exploiting MCMC sampling algorithm [44] , [45] can effectively sparse rating matrix, and it is in order that only a finite number of features would be ''active'' for any finite dataset. Moreover, it is really flexible to adopt Bayesian inference on factor matrices with an unbounded number of columns. By following IBP (Indian buffet process) [41] to solve problem IV.4, we replace U by Z and substitute it to corresponding equations such as M = (Z , V , θ ). Here, we set
and ρ 1 < · · · < ρ L−1 are specified as a prior guidance towards an ascending sequence of large-margin thresholds. α, σ and ς are hyper-parameters. Regularizer and loss fully specified, a probabilistic formulation of MAP estimation can be described as follows:
Finally, the prediction rule is accordingly changed to Y ij = max{r|Z i V j ≥ θ r−1 , r = 1, · · · , L} for user i on item j (in a rating matrix ZV ).
C. EVALUATING PREDICTION DEVIATIONS FOR SPOTTING ANOMALOUS USERS
Items are considered as target items when they are rated proportionally high number of the maximum or minimum ratings compared with the remained items. The intuition behind this is that attackers just focus on the same specific items and rate with the maximum or minimum rating many times to promote or demote the items to recommendation list. These items are naturally deemed as suspected items (e.g., target items). All attackers who rated those suspected items with maximum or minimum rating can be easily determined. Previous researches have been developed detection techniques by analyzing rating distributions of target items in order to capture attack profiles [26] , [32] , [33] . In this paper, the suspected items will be determined in the similar way. Since attackers focus on the same items, the deviations of rating prediction on these items are conventionally higher than the others. Although matrix factorization based recommendation algorithm can not fully predict users' preferences, the prediction results are acceptable compared with competing recommendation methods (corresponding experiments are provided in section V-C2). Moreover, matrix factorization is totally different with collaborative filtering recommendation. This intuition inspired us to detect anomalous ratings which made by shilling attackers. Just as Figure 1 illustrated, the prediction errors on test sets for each item and user are calculated. And then we continue to comprehensively analyze error distributions of user and item to spot abnormal ratings.
Based on the observation, the MPE of each item or user can be calculated on the test dataset using the trained model, which is defined as follows,
where p ui and r ui are the predicted and real ratings, respectively. I is the set of total items. Note that, only r min or r max is taken into considered. In order to amplify the possibility of abnormality existence, we only concern the minimum rating in the testing stage. For instance, we firstly calculate the MPE for each item and directly show distribution of MPE as presented in Figures 2 b(1) and b (2) . Fixed an empirical threshold of MPE ε i , all suspected items can be determined when the corresponding MPEs of items are greater than ε i . The concerned users who rate the suspected items with the maximum or minimum rating can be easily detected. Actually, we also analyze the situation of considering whole ratings in the systems as demonstrated in Figure 2 a(1) and a (2) . Nevertheless, it is difficult to recognize the significant difference between genuine users and attackers purely using mean prediction errors. The suspected items can not be correctly determined among all items no matter what threshold of MPE, due to the MPEs between the concerned item and the others are confused each other (as shown in Figures 2 a(1) and a(2) ). These results may indicate that the prediction accuracy of matrix factorization is not too high. Fortunately, it is optimistic that the distinction between items (suspected item and unsuspected item) can become obvious when all ratings which equal to the maximum or minimum score are only considered. In this case, the difference of MPE between items may be sufficiently expanded and then the concerned attackers can also be naturally recognized. In Algorithm 1, the pseudo-code of spotting anomalous users is presented. In
Specifically, discovering interesting findings on real-world data using the proposed detection framework is also investigated. The goal of the presented approach is to deal with real-world data. For real-world rating data, detected results including suspicious items or users can be obtained using the presented approach. How to further determine the suspected users or items is desired. In this paper, three diverse metrics for abnormality forensics are discussed, more details will be introduced in section V-D.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we firstly introduce the experimental data and settings. And then, we briefly analyze the experimental results including detection performance of our proposed method compared with benchmark methods, the effectiveness under diverse attacks, discovering findings on real-world data and final discussions.
A. EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND SETTINGS
In this section, experimental settings and datasets will be firstly described. Then, the details of each attack model are introduced.
1) EXPERIMENTAL DATA
Extensive experiments on MovieLens-100K 1 and Amazon 2 datasets are respectively conducted. The two datasets are detailed as follows:
• MovieLens-100K dataset: Rating behaviors of genuine users in CFRSs are described using the MovieLens-100K dataset. It consists of 100,000 ratings on 1,682 movies by 943 users and each user had to rate at least 20 movies. All ratings are in the form of integral values between 1 and 5, where 1 denotes disliked and 5 denotes most liked.
• Amazon dataset: It contains product reviews and metadata from Amazon, including 143.7 million reviews spanning May 1996 -July 2014. This dataset includes reviews (ratings, text, helpfulness votes), product metadata (descriptions, category information, price, brand, and image features), and links (also viewed and bought graphs) [46] , [47] . For generating attack profiles, we conduct a list of attack experiments using 11 different attack models (see next subsection). For each attack model, attack profiles are constructed according to the corresponding attack model with diverse attack sizes 3 {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%, 27.6%} and filler sizes 4 {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}. Therefore, we have 396 (11 × 6 × 6) experimental datasets including 11 different attack models, 6 different attack sizes and 6 different filler sizes. Note that, the final experimental dataset is constructed by combining generated attack profiles and genuine profiles for each attack model. To ensure the rationality of the results, the target item is randomly selected for each attack profile and just singletarget attack is considered in all experiments. Additionally, we only focus on the nuke attacks in this paper, the proposed technique framework can be directly used to the push attacks.
Furthermore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, experiments on a real-world dataset, Amazon dataset, are conducted. Our goal expects to discover anomalous ratings or items. More details will be introduced in what follows. For the experimentally generated datasets, each experiment was run ten times and took an average. For Amazon dataset, five sub-matrices are randomly selected from original rating matrix. Note that, some rows of original matrix are only sampled and all columns of matrix are not changed. It is noteworthy that algorithms strongly dependent on the characteristics of the datasets, so the results obtained in our study may not coincide with those obtained with data from other domains. All numerical studies are implemented using MATLAB R2016b and Python 2.6.8 on a server with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz CPU, 32GB memory and Linux operating system.
2) ATTACK MODELS
To generate attack profiles, 11 different attack models are respectively exploited with diverse attack sizes and filler sizes.
Concretely, two kinds of special attacks are utilized to generate attack profiles. ''power users'' in the CFRS are able to influence the largest group of users [48] - [51] . The influence is indicated by the ability of power user u to change the prediction for another user v, or for power user u's target item to appear in user v's top-N list [52] . Similarly, ''power items'' in the CFRS can influence the largest group of items. The influence is represented by the ability of power item i to change the recommender system prediction for other user u, or for user u's target item to appear in user j's top-N list [52] . Additionally, let N (r, σ 2 ) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean r and standard deviation σ , the details of 7 general attack models and 4 special attacks are respectively described as follows:
• Random attack: No selected items, I S = φ. The ratings of filler items are chosen independently from a Gaussian distribution, ρ(i) ∼ N (r, σ 2 ), where r denotes the average rating over all items and users, and σ denotes the standard deviation of ratings over all items and users [53] .
• Average attack: I S = φ and ρ(i) ∼ N (r i , σ i 2 ), where r i is the average rating of item i over all the users that rated this item, and σ i denotes the standard deviation of ratings of item i over all the users who have rated this item [53] .
• Bandwagon (random) attack: I S contains a set of popular items, σ (i) = r max õr r min (push or nuke) and ρ(i) ∼ N (r, σ 2 ) [54] .
• Segment attack: I S contains a set of segmented items, these items are given r max or r min to make them similar to the target items. And then, we use these items as I S , σ (i) = r max õr r min (push or nuke) and ρ(i) = r min õr r max (push or nuke) [39] .
• Reverse bandwagon attack: I S contains a set of unpopular items, σ (i) = r min õr r max (push or nuke) and
• Love/Hate attack: I S = φ and ρ(i) = r min õr r max (push or nuke) [39] .
• AOP attack: Choosing filler items with equal probability from the top x% of most popular items rather than from the entire collection of items is a simple and effective strategy for obfuscating the Average attack [52] .
• PUA-AS attack: The top 50 users with the highest aggregate similarity (AS) scores become the selected set of power users. This method requires at least 5 co-rated items between users u and v and does not use significance weighting [49] .
• PUA-NR attack: Power users are the users with the highest number of ratings who are selected from the top 50 users based on the total number of ratings that they have in their user profile [49] .
• PIA-AS attack: The top-N items with the highest aggregate similarity (AS) scores become the selected set of power items. This method requires at least 5 users who have rated the same item i and item j [52] .
• PIA-NR attack: Power items are the items with the highest number of user ratings. We select them from the top-N items based on the total number of user ratings which they have in their profile [52] .
B. EVALUATION METRICS
To measure the effectiveness of the presented detection methods, we use detection rate and false alarm rate in this paper. Detection rate is defined as the number of detected attack profiles divided by the number of attack profiles. False alarm rate is the number of genuine profiles that are predicted as attack profiles divided by the number of genuine profiles.
Detection rate = |D ∩ A| |A| (V.1)
where D is the set of the detected user profiles, the set of attacker profiles is defined as A, and G denotes the set of genuine user profiles [11] .
To determine the accuracy rate of the detection method that it can correctly identify attackers without sacrificing the classification accuracy for genuine users, we use Recall, Precision and F-measure [35] 
where ''True positive'' indicates the number of correctly classified attack profiles, ''False positive'' is the number of authentic profiles that were misclassified, and ''False negative'' denotes the number of attack profiles that were misclassified.
In addition, to evaluate generalization in terms of prediction performance, we utilize mean prediction error (MPE), normalized mean absolute error (NMAE) and mean squared error (MSE) measures which are defined as follows:
where p ui is the predicted rating of user u on item i by matrix factorization, r ui is the correspondingly actual rating. U and I respectively denote a set of users and items. I (u) is a set of items rated by user u. E [MAE] denotes the expected value of the MAE assuming uniformly distributed observed and predicted rating values. In our experiments, we set E [MAE] equal to 1.6 for Movielens-100K dataset [35] , [55] .
C. COMPARISON
To show the detection performance and effectiveness of the proposed method as much as possible, a series of experiments are conducted, which includes sample size selection, comparison with benchmark methods and detection results in diverse attacks. 
1) DETERMINING SAMPLE SIZE
Just as aforementioned settings of experiments, we randomly select a set of ''weak'' data [41] to construct the training and test datasets. Different sizes of selected samples may perform different experimental results, therefore, we generate experiments to examine the impact of sample size in order to choose a comparatively reasonable value. Take AOP attack for example, Table 3 shows the precision and recall with diverse numbers of sample size N w . We can see that the highest precision and recall corresponds to 800 samples (based on MovieLens-100K dataset). It means that N w equal to 800 is a relatively reasonable choice for constructing the ''weak'' dataset. Note that, not enough users are left for the training set after pruning [41] if N w is too high (i.e., greater than 900).
2) COMPARISON WITH BENCHMARKED METHODS
A series of experiments are conducted to demonstrate the detection performance of the presented method compared with baselines. All presented methods are briefly described as follows:
• DeR-TIA: An unsupervised group detection method which combines an improved metric based on Degree of Similarity with Top Neighbors (DegSim ) and Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement (RDMA) [32] , [33] , [56] . In the experiments, the absolute count threshold θ is set to 6.
• PCA-based: The method first transforms an entire useritem matrix to a hyper-plane and then represents each profile with three principal components. The profiles that are closed to the origin of the hyper-plane are finally identified as attackers [11] , [20] , [32] , [36] .
• βP-based: It is an unsupervised detection method which incorporates Beta distribution into detection [11] . In the experiments, the quantiles used in the first and second stages, q f and q s , are set to 8E-13 and 0.01015, respectively.
• Ours: In the experiments, we set N w equal to 800. The parameters ε u and ε i are set to 0.11 and 6, respectively. As shown in Figure 3 , it demonstrates the performance under two different attacks (take AOP and random attacks for examples). One observation is that DeR-TIA, PCA-based and βP-based methods can partly detect attack profiles when the filler size is 10.3% and the attack size varies both in random and AOP attacks as illustrated in Figures 3 a(1) and 3 b(1) . Compared with baselines, the advantage of the proposed method is more obvious in most of cases except for βP-based when the attack size is 1.1% and filler size is 10.3% as shown in Figure 3 a(1) . Generally, the larger the attack sizes, the easier it is to be detected. The behavior of attack is not obvious when the attack size is small. In reality, it is difficult to judge whether a system is attacked when the attack size is small. Naturally, detecting anomalous ratings in the case of small attack sizes is challenging. Similarly, in the case of 11.7% attack size, the same phenomenon can be observed as shown in Figures 3 a(2) and 3 b(2) . In addition, when the attack size is 11.7% and the filler size varies, both βP-based and our methods can achieve near perfect detection rates with the increase of filler size, although the false alarm rates are not the best as shown in Figures 3(b) and 3(d) . With sacrificing the false alarm rates of the proposed method, comparatively, the best detection rates can be achieved regardless of diverse attack sizes and filler sizes.
Additionally, comparative experiments using different matrix factorization based methods in AOP attack are provided in order to demonstrate the outperformance of matrix factorization. As is known, shilling attacks or profile injection attacks are designed for collaborative filtering recommender systems, exploiting a matrix factorization based method for obtaining prediction deviation is favorable to avoid promotion or demotion behaviors created by shilling attackers. Many representative matrix factorization methods have been studied in previous [41] , [42] , [57] , [58] . To demonstrate prediction performance of matrix factorization approaches, we selectively exploit four diverse matrix factorization methods to implement compared with the employed method as demonstrated in Figures 3 a(3) and 3 b(3) . We can see that the employed matrix factorization method can achieve competing prediction results compared with benchmarks. Of course, our experimental results are only for reference. It is remarkable that the process of matrix factorization can not essentially determine the whole detection performance of the presented method. Relative prediction deviations are roughly obtained in order to recognize the obvious abnormality of rating prediction errors of users or items.
To investigate computational cost of the presented methods, a series of experiments are implemented on diverse datasets as illustrated in Table 4 . For DeR-TIA, its time complexity can be briefly represented as O(|U ||I | + |U | 2 + N t N k m|U | + |I | + |U |), where |U | and |I | are the number of users and items, respectively. N t , N k and m are the number of iterations, clusters and records, respectively. The computational time mainly depends on |U | and |I |. Therefore, the computational time of DeR-TIA gradually increases with the increase of attack sizes. With regard to βP-based, O(|U |t 1 + |U |t 2 + |U |) denotes its time complexity [11] , where t 1 and t 2 are the computation time of calculating the corresponding bound of numbers of rated items b n (u) and computing b r (u) upper and b r (u) lower , respectively. We can see that the computational time purely depends on |U |. |U |) and p 3 denote the time complexity of covariance matrix computation and eigen-value decomposition, respectively [19] . Note that, the number of features is small. Therefore, the time complexity of PCA-based mainly depends on |U |. Similarly, the computational time gradually increases with the increase of attack sizes.
For the proposed approach, we only discuss its time complexity in the stage of training, which can be roughly repre-
where |U | and |V | denote the dimensions of user-specific coefficient matrix and item-specific factor matrix, respectively. N and L are the number of instances of training dataset and the maximum rating in the system, respectively. Note that, the dimensions of user-specific coefficient matrix and item-specific factor matrix are small compared with the number of users and items due to the training dataset. Moreover, only considering r min score for users and items partly reduces the dimensions of U and V . In Table 4 , the implementation time of the presented approach is relatively small compared with benchmarks. The reasons behind the phenomenon may be attributed to a) calculating RDMA and DegSim (similarity) of the first stage of DeR-TIA consumed a lot of time, b) PCA-based firstly calculates covariance (similar to similarity calculation) of each pair of users based on a useritem rating matrix, which needs a lot of computation time, and c) βP-based shows relatively stable as the attack profiles increase due to the designed structure of βP-based which uses probability distribution of metadata. Without doubt, all of the experimental results are only for reference.
3) DETECTION RESULTS IN DIVERSE ATTACKS
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method in 11 different attack models, extensive experiments are conducted under each attack model with diverse attack sizes and filler sizes. As aforementioned, we repeat the random partition ten times. In each partition, 800 users are randomly selected in the case of weak [41] . Furthermore, each experiment is ran ten times and took an average to report. As shown in Figure 4 , one observation is that the F-measures are increasingly concentrated with the increase of filler size and attack size and close to the best F-measure for most of attacks. These results may be attributed to more attack profiles have been selected in the stage of sampling, which results in suspected items can be easily concerned as target items in the stage of outlier detection. Similarly, the second observation is that the F-measures are too scattered with the decrease of filler size and attack size. These results may indicate that few attack profiles have been selected in the stage of sampling. It is noteworthy that the experimental results just based on randomly selected profiles, the detection performance largely depends on the selected samples (including attack profiles and genuine profiles).
For examining rating prediction performance, a list of experiments also are conducted to show prediction error of the employed matrix factorization approach. In Tables 5, 6 and 7, the average values of NMAE, MSE and HLE (Hinge Loss Error) [41] , [42] of the presented prediction algorithm are reported in different attack models with diverse filler sizes and attack sizes. When the attack size unchanged, we can see that NMAE, MSE and HLE are not obviously changed with the increase of filler size. Similarly, keeping the filler size unchanged, NMAE, MSE and HLE are not significantly changed with the increase of attack size. These results might be attributed to a) the prediction performance of the employed prediction approach is robust, which largely bypasses the threats of shilling attacks; b) a little changes of NMAE and MSE are favorable to detect the concerned items in the stage of outlier detection.
D. DISCOVERIES ON REAL-WORLD DATA
To demonstrate the application of the proposed detection strategy, a series of experiments are conducted on a realworld dataset, Amazon dataset. Some of interesting discoveries are reported and analyzed in what follows. Note that, suspected items determined by the proposed method are only discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we tried our best to protect individuals' privacy information. Since the detected items are not totally conformed for reality (there is no groundtruth for us), the detected results should be deeply analyzed. In order to further verify the anomalous items, we present three evaluation metrics:
• Time cost of attacks: timestamps are very concentrated (e.g., in the same day).
• Disagreement of intention: almost all ratings only belong to the maximum and minimum ratings.
• Time series analysis: historical ratings are reanalyzed to look for obvious abnormality. It is identified as a suspected item if the ratings and timestamps on an item simultaneously satisfy these metrics. Moreover, investigating abnormal rating trends is used for auxiliary analysis. For the first metric, all attackers focus on the same item within a short time to save the cost of attack. For the second one, shilling attackers promote or demote the target items with maximum or minimum rating to achieve their benefit maximization. Based on the previous two evaluation metrics, we further explore rating trends for special items in order to determine abnormal rating behaviors. Note that, few suspected items are detected using the proposed detection approach as shown in Figure 5 . Figure 5 demonstrates the mean prediction error (MPE) of item, all suspected items which have high MPE that greater than an empirical threshold can be determined. We can observe that 8 suspected items are selected. What's even more important, each suspected item is deeply analyzed to further spot the concerned items.
In the experiments, one suspected item (ID: 0385519478 on Amazon) is taken for example to investigate abnormal rating distribution based on the presented metrics. Firstly, rating distribution and time concentration of the suspected item are provided as illustrated in Figure 6 . As the second metric described, almost all ratings of an item only belong to 1 or 5 may indicate abnormal item. Meanwhile, the distribution of timestamp can be considered for each item. We can observe that 134 raters rated item ''0385519478'' with the maximum rating and 39 raters rated the same item with the minimum rating on December 1, 2014. It means that anomalous rating behaviors may exist during 2014 on Amazon dataset.
To further analyze the possibility of abnormality, we incorporate time series analysis for auxiliary validation. Specifically, the original rating data is decomposed into seasonal, trend and remainder components (using seasonal decomposition of time series by LOESS, a.k.a. STL decomposition [59] - [61] ) as illustrated in Figure 7 . Seasonal effects are necessary to be analyzed for a suspected item (e.g., clothes on Amazon) due to actual demand of the item. In Figure 7 , we can obverse that seasonal effect is not too obvious and the influence of trend is relatively large. Additionally, there is a certain fluctuation on remainder. It is an effective way to remove seasonal and trend components using difference of time series [59] - [61] . Concretely, we denote a time series of a special item as {X t }, first order difference {∇X t }, first order difference with lagging 12 phase {∇ 12 X t } and its first order difference {∇∇ 12 X t } are illustrated in Figure 8 , respectively. One observation is that obvious trends have disappeared after the first order difference. Nevertheless, some of uncertain fluctuations still can not be eliminated in few years. Note that, the goal of STL decomposition and difference is to eliminate interfering ratings in order to effectively predict rating trends for the special item. In our experiments, we exploit Holt-Winters model to predict rating trends based on STL decomposition and difference of time series [59] - [61] , the additive HoltWinters prediction function is defined as follows,
where s is the cycle.x t (h) denotes the predicted value at time t and step h. L t , T t and S t denote local level, trend and seasonal, respectively, which are defined below,
where α, β and γ are smoothing parameters which are set as 0.03457352, 0.02909551 and 0.2598126 in our experiments, respectively. Based on historical ratings of the suspected item, predicting rating trend of the item using Holt-Winters model in the special stage (during December, 2014) is also demonstrated in Figure 9 . Although abnormality rating points are not very obvious from the predicted rating series compared with original series, analysis of abnormality ratings discussed in our experiments only tries to provide a reference way for real application. Without doubt, our experimental results are for reference only.
E. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION
Summarizing all experimental results, few insights are worth of discussion as follows:
• Before matrix factorization, user rating profiles (containing attack profiles and genuine profiles) are reasonably sampled, which is favorable to reduce computational cost for later. What is even more important, we generate a sub-matrix from original rating matrix and simultaneously keep a reasonable sampling distribution.
• Although the prediction performance of Max-margin matrix factorization which has different prediction mechanism is partly limited, relative error shift of prediction can be roughly used to select suspicious items in the early stage. In the stage of outlier detection, all ratings that equal to the minimum (or the maximum) score are only considered. It is useful to shrink the scope of detection and accurately find out suspected items.
Of course, we also examined all ratings for detecting suspected items, but it was difficult to distinguish between normal items and real suspected items.
• In real-world application, detected items are further analyzed one by one using the proposed method due to there is no ground-truth. Just to be clear, more suspected items or ratings may exist in Amazon dataset, we have tried our best to discover suspected items as much as possible. Note that, the detected items may not be totally attacked by profile injection attackers, the phenomenon of anomaly distribution may be similar to profile injection attacks.
• An reasonable threshold and the characteristics of the datasets are crucial in determining the performance of the proposed approach. Figure 3 shows the outperformance of the presented method compared with benchmarks in two attacks with diverse attack sizes and filler sizes. In addition, Figure 4 also demonstrates overall detection results in 10 different attacks. In addition to the cases of small attack sizes, the detection performance of the presented method is acceptable in most of cases. Therefore, the generalization of the proposed method is partly limited. Nevertheless, small scale attacks and authentic behaviors are a game process in reality. It is difficult to determine whether a system is attacked.
• The goal of the proposed method is to discover interesting findings on real-world data (unlabeled data) using heuristic knowledge learned from synthetic data (labeled data). Indeed, the novelty of the proposed method for rating prediction is limited. Note that, the process of rating prediction using an existing matrix factorization method does not totally determine the performance of the whole detection approach. Relative deviations of rating prediction for each user and item are concerned. In fact, we want to try to find a feasible way for dealing with real-world data. How to design abnormality forensic metrics in unlabeled data is a potential challenge.
• In the experiments, we have tried our best to construct the final synthetic datasets using 11 diverse attack models. Although different shilling attacks which focus on collaborative recommender systems with diverse cases are provided to create attack profiles, potential abnormality behaviors such as co-rating behaviors, anomalous rating behaviors and etc. [37] , [38] on real-world data are expected to be captured. Note that, real-world data such as Amazon data may not contain shilling attack profiles. It is also unclear whether the system has been attacked in reality. Inspired by heuristic knowledge for detecting shilling attacks learned from the synthetic data, shilling attacks or anomalous rating behaviors on online rating systems may be empirically recognized. Of course, all detected abnormalities on real-world data need to be further analyzed using forensics metrics (see section V-D). Therefore, we discuss the problem of abnormality detection in rating systems.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Profile injection attacks are the main threats in collaborative filtering recommender systems. In this paper, we proposed an unsupervised detection method for spotting such attacks or anomalous ratings. By utilizing a fast matrix factorization approach, the rating prediction error on each item can be calculated in order to reveal the difference between predicted rating and actual rating. More importantly, these fluctuating errors are favorable to respond the potential threat which comes from abnormal ratings or attacks. Based on the mean prediction errors of items, suspected items can be detected using an empirical threshold of error and spotted attackers or anomalous ratings can also be finally captured. Compared with benchmarks which suffer from the high false alarm rate in same cases, the proposed method showed higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate. Additionally, abnormality forensics analysis for a suspected item on Amazon dataset have been discussed. In our future work, more real-world datasets such as Taobao, Yelp etc., will be considered to discover anomalous users, items and ratings. Specifically, rating data containing anomalous profiles is worthy of first consideration. Due to real-world datasets generally belong to large-scale datasets, how to fast and effectively deal with those datasets also is desired.
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